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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

Case no,

Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JESUS A. SEPULVEDA,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal concerning the ruling denying the defendants
Motion to Suppress by the Fourth Judicial District Court.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF
APPELLANT REVIEW
The

issues

on appeal

are: first, was

the

length

of

the

detention of the defendant by the officer justifiable by probable
cause?

Second, did the fact that the defendant was acting in a

supposedly "nervous" manner give the officer enough probable cause
to search the defendants vehicle?

Third, did the defendant give

the officer consent to search voluntarily, when the defendant does
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not fluently speak english and was detained illegally prior to the
search?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS/ STATUTES AND RULES
Any

relevant

text

of

constitutional/

statutory/

or

rule

provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented on
appeal is contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Jesus A. Sepulvedaf was traveling northbound on I15 near Nephi, Utah.

The defendant was stopped by Officer Paul

Mangelson, of the Utah Highway Patrol/ and subsequently arrested
for possession of illegal drugs*
The defendant made a Motion to suppress the drug evidence on
the basis that it was illegally obtained.
by the Fourth Judicial District Court.
tried and sentenced to serve time.

This motion was denied
Mr. Sepulveda was then

The defendant now appeals his

sentence on the arguments presented in this brief.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant, while traveling on 1-15 near Nephi/ Utah/ on
January 30/ 1990f was stopped by officer Paul Mangelsonf of the
Utah Highway Patrol.

The vehicle driven by the defendant was in

all respectsf being operated in an appropriate and legal manner,
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however the vehicle registration was good only through the month
of December, 1989. The expired registration was the reason given
by the officer for the stop. Officer Mangelson also testified that
the defendant did meet a drug courier profile. (T 14f26)

The

record shows that the defendant speaks Spanish as his primary
language and can understand a "little" English and had to rely for
communication upon a passenger during the initial stop and a
translator during the trial. (T 45)

After the initial inquiry

about drivers license, registration and destination, defendant was
directed to exit the vehicle.
The officer also noticed that the defendant was visibly shaking,
and he attributed this nervous behavior to the defendant's wrongdoing. (T 33) This observation, the loose drug profile, and disturbed
paint on the screw head which secured the back seat lead Officer
Mangelson to believe that the defendant was transporting drugs.
The Officer then began to search the vehicle on the basis that the
defendant gave a consent to search.

The defendant denies that he

was asked for, or gave permission, to search or look into the
vehicle.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The defendant was justifiably stopped by Officer Mangelson for
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expired registration.

However, the defendant was detained and his

vehicle was searched, all without probable cause.

The officer can

only articulate that the defendant was visibly shaken, and the
paint on the screws holding the seat was disturbed.

These facts

alone could not make a reasonable person conclude that a crime was
being committed or about to be committed.
the

defendant's

evidence

obtained

Constitutional
from

the

rights

illegal

Based on these facts

were

violated

search,

should

and
have

the
been

suppressed in the original trial.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DETENTION OF THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT JUSTIFIED BY PROBABLE CAUSE
Both the United States Constitution and the Constitution of
Utah protect individuals against illegal searches and seizures.
Constitution of Utah Article I, Section 14
"The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not
be violated;"
The defendant asserts that his rights under article I, section
14 of the Utah Constitution were violated, due to the fact that the
officer did not have any reasonable suspicion to detain him or
subsequently search his vehicle and himself.
5

In State v. Leonard

173 Utah Adv. Rep. 50, the court refers to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), saying:
The Terry Court held that a police officer must be able
to Point to "specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inference from those facts,
reasonably warrant that intrusion."
The reasonable suspicion standard is stated in Utah Code Ann,
section 77-7-15 (1990) :
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place
when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has
committed or is in the act of committing or attempting
to commit a public offense and may demand his name,
address and an explanation of his actions.
In this case, there

is no evidence

that would

lead

the

reasonable person to conclude that the defendant is committing or
about to commit a crime, except the fact that the defendant had
expired registration and fit the drug courier profile. A reasonable person could not possibly justify a search of an individual and
an individuals vehicle on those points themselves.
In a very helpful case dealing with the search and seizure of
an individual the Utah Court of Appeals found that the individual
was detained without reasonable and articulable suspicion.
v. Carter

156

Utah Adv. Rep. 17

(1991) the court

found

State
that

the failure of defendant to produce identification, the officers
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perception of line at defendants waist, and pat down observations
made by officers was not sufficient to constitute a reasonable
suspicion either alone or in the aggregate.

In the present case

the defendant was only driving an unregistered car, and responded
nervously, as do most people, upon being approached by an officer.
There was no evidence of drug use and no smell of marijuana or any
other contraband.

And no evidence of any other crime.

Thus the

facts presented should allow the defendant to suppress the evidence
found in his illegal search.
POINT II
THE OFFICERS RELIANCE ON THE DEFENDANTS NERVOUS BEHAVIOR WAS NOT
PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH THE DEFENDANT AND DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE
When being pulled over by a peace officer it is a* very
natural response for an ordinary citizen to be nervous. However,
this fact could not lead an officer to believe that a crixne is
being committed and therefore justify a search.

If it were eyery,

"nervous" individual would be suspected of committing a crime. In
the case State v. Godina-Luna 179 Utah Adv. Rep 21,(1992) the court
states;
The fact that defendants were nervous does not raise a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, nor does the
fact that they were proceeding in a less than direct^
route to their destination.
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In a similar case State v. Mendoza 748 P2d 181 (Utah 1987) the
court held that the officers reliance on the defendants nervous
behavior could have no weight in determining reasonable suspicion.
In addition the Mendoza case refers to Brignoni-Ponce, 442 U.S.
885,886 saying that several factors listed in the Brignoni-Ponce
case are absent from the Mendoza case as they are in the present
one.
Defendants did not try to evade the officers, nor did
they attempt to conceal anyone or anything when the
officers began pursuing....nor was there any indication
that the vehicle was heavily loaded.
Due to the fact that the defendant was only shaking (acting
nervous) there was no reason for the officer to detain the defendant for the time that he did.

This statement is reinforced in

State v. Godina-Luna 179 Utah Adv. Rep. 21 (1992) , State v. Johnson
805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991) where the court said,
the length and scope of the detention must be strictly
tied to and justified by the circumstance which rendered
its initiation permissible. Once the reason for the
initial stop have been satisfied, the individual must be
allowed to proceed on his or her way.
Based on the illegal detention, and lack of probable cause,
the motion to suppress evidence should have been granted.
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POINT III
THE DEFENDANT DID NOT GIVE THE OFFICER CONSENT TO SEARCH
VOLUNTARILY AND WITHOUT PRIOR ILLEGALITY
In State v. Carter 156 Utah Adv. Rep. 17 (1991), the court
sets forth a

two-prong test which must be met for consent to

search to be lawfully obtained.
a two-prong test must be met for the evidence to be
admissible: "(1) the consent must be voluntary in fact:
and (2) the consent must not be obtain by police exploitation of prior illegality."
It is the states burden to prove that this test was met in
order

to

obtained.

show

that

the consent

of

the defendant

was

legally

The court records show that their was a language barrier

between Officer Mangelson and Mr. Sepulveda, this is evidenced by
the fact that there was the need of a translator through-out the
entire trial.

In Carter, the Court refers to Marshall 791 P.2d at

887 to show the standard that must be met by the state to prove
voluntary consent.

One of these standards states;

(1) There must be clear and positive testimony that the
consent was "unequivocal and specific" and "freely and
intelligently given";
In this case there is emphasis added to "intelligently given".
How could Mr. Sepulveda have possibly given intelligent consent
when he does not speak English and Mr. Mangelson does not speak
9

Spanish?
Alsof the defendant contends that the illegal detention by the
officers, lead to the search. In Carter it states,
the defendant's consent was tainted by the prior illegal
seizure as a matter of law and, therefore, that the
contraband should have been suppressed.
The state argued that the defendant voluntarily opened up the
trunk of the car.

This action could be attributed to the fact that

the defendant was intimidated by the officer and felt he had no
rights.

In Godina-Luna

a

similar

situation

existed

and

the

defendant Orozco invited the officer to search.
The deputy's question which prompted Orozco1s invitation
confirmed defendant's belief that because he was Mexican
and did not have a drivers license, a search would be
inevitable whether he consented or not. Therefore, we
conclude that Orozco1s invitation to search was the
result of the exploitation of his illegal detention.
The state has failed to meet the two-prong test to show that
the

defendant

illegality.

gave

consent

voluntarily

and

without

prior

For this reason the court should hold the evidence

obtained from the illegal search inadmissible.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, this court should reverse
the decision made on the Motion to Suppress.
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DATED this

day of April, 1992,

'MILTCfN T/ HARMON
Attorney for the Defendant and
Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Brief of Appellant to: Mr. R. Paul Van Dam, Utah Attorney
General, State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, UT 84114; Mr.
Donald J. Eyre, Jr., Juab County Attorney, 125 North Main, Nephi,
UT 84648; Mr. Jesus Sepulveda, c/o Eunice Diaz, 3494 West Lake
Circle, Apt. 4, West Valley City, UT 84119; first-class postage
prepaid, this J&J?
day of April, 1992.
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ADDENDUM

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden —
Issuance of warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized.
isoo

UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and
question suspect — Grounds.
A peace officer may stop any person in a public
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe
he has committed or is in the act of committing or is
attempting to commit a public offense and may demand his name, address and an explanation of his
1B80
actions.
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